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Dissertation:
The World in Mind
The
Measure
of Knowledge | draft
available via email
Papers on Consciousness The
Cogito and the Metaphysics of Mind |
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.pdf Since writing this paper, I have come to realize that the problem the
paper generates arises only if we take the temporal character of experience
at face value. That is, if conscious experience is instantiated as it
seems to be, and as is almost never questioned, then we face the uncomfortable
dilemma the "Cogito" paper argues we do. However, there is an
alternative way to conceive of how experience is instantiated, which blocks
the argument. This way I develop in a second paper, "The Ontology
of Experience". The Ontology of Experience |
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.pdf On the face of it, phenomenological properties are instantiated throughout periods of time. If we feel a pain, or see a colour, or hear a sound, the pain, colour or sound seem to be present throughout the period for which we are feeling, seeing or hearing it. Few have thought to question, or seen the need to defend, this conception of conscious experience. In my view, this conception is a mistake - an illusion - and the consequences for the philosophy of mind are significant. I defend an alternative account of the ontology of experience according to which conscious experiences are representational processes that bear contents over times, where the contents of the representations are that certain properties (colours, sounds, shapes, and so on) are instantiated throughout times. Representational accounts of consciousness are not new, nor is the claim that some temporal aspects of experience are properties of the representational content rather than of the representational vehicle. However, the representational theory I defend is novel in claiming (i) that the 'throughout time' character of experience is part of the representational content of the experience, and (ii) that the representational vehicle must be instantiated over rather than throughout time. Moreover, the arguments in favour of the representationalism I advocate are novel and thus may appeal to those who are unmoved by standard arguments for representationalism..
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