There are two aspects to my research. One interest involves work on a variety of familiar problems in the philosophy of mind – I have papers on the conceivability argument for dualism, on causal closure, on belief and entertainment, on a new defense of representationalism about conscious experience, and on believing conjunctions. But my greatest interest centres on a project that independently raises, and then connects, three issues in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. On the mind side is the question of how we are to understand the part/whole structure of belief, and in particular the question of whether beliefs are properly understood as individuals. On the epistemological side is the question of what it is to know more, or of what it is to improve one's epistemic contact with the world. And on the metaphysics side is the question of what the world is like such that more of it can be known. The questions overlap since as Stalnaker has said, “one can never fully disentangle questions about the nature of representation from questions about the nature of what is represented”.